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THE USE OF OHIO'S PREFERENCE LAW IN BANKRUPTCY:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO SECTION 547 WITH A LONGER
'REACH-BACK' PERIOD
THOMAS D. BUCKLEY*
INTRODUCTION
Ohio is one of the few states with a preference law of general
application among its debtor-creditor statutes.1 Ohio Revised Code
sections 1313.56 and 1313.572 give creditors an avoidance power
Copyright © 1992, Thomas D. Buckley.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. A.B., Fordham College; J.D., Yale Law School. The author is
indebted to Michael E. McNealis, Class of 1993, CSU-CM College of Law, for
invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 Kentucky, Maryland, and New Mexico are the other states. KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378.060 (Baldwin 1981); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-101
(1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-9-1, 56-9-47 (Michie 1978). The Maryland statute
incorporates into state law the preference provisions of federal bankruptcy law.
A six-month statute of limitations is applicable in both Kentucky and New
Mexico. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-070 (Baldwin 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-9-
2 (Michie 1978). West Virginia repealed a preference law of general application
in 1986. See W. VA. CODE § 40-1-5, repealed by 1986 W. Va. Acts, c.166.
In Oklahoma, a preferential trust settled by an insolvent is deemed a trust
for the benefit of all creditors. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 31 (West 1987).
In many states, a preference transferred within a specified period of time
before a general assignment for the benefit of creditors can be avoided by the
assignee. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 151 (1954) (four months); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A.19-3 (West 1987) (four months); CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1800 (West
1982) (ninety days).
Preference laws applicable only to insolvent insurance companies or banks
are found in over thirty states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-32-27 (1986)
(insurance); ALASKA STAT. § 21.78.250 (1991) (insurance); CAL. FIN. CODE §
17639 (West 1989) (banking).
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act makes preferences transferred to
insiders voidable. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
See Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 UCC L.J. 195,
204-05 (1986).
See generally STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 439-41 (4th ed. 1987) (history).
2. Section 1313.56 states,
§ 1313.56: Appointment of a Receiver. A sale, conveyance,
transfer, mortgage, or assignment, made in trust or otherwise by a
debtor, and every judgment suffered by him against himself in
(continued)
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similar to a bankruptcy trustee's avoidance power under federal
bankruptcy law.3
A preference law can apply when an insolvent debtor makes a
transfer to an unsecured creditor holding a preexisting claim.
Because the debtor's insolvency means that other creditors, as a
group, cannot receive as much satisfaction with respect to their
claims, the effect of such a transfer is to "prefer" the transferee. If
under preference law the bankruptcy trustee "avoids" the preferential
transfer, the preferred creditor has to give up what it has received, its
claim against the insolvent debtor is restored, and the property
transferred becomes available for distribution ratably among all the
creditors.
The Ohio preference law can be enforced by a nonpreferred
creditor in an Ohio state court, while Bankruptcy Code section 547,
"Preferences," is applicable in a federal bankruptcy case. In a
bankruptcy case, however, a bankruptcy trustee cannot only invoke
contemplation of insolvency and with a design to prefer one or more
creditors to the exclusion in whole or in part of others, and a sale,
conveyance, transfer, mortgage, or assignment made, or judgment
procured by him to be rendered, in any manner, with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors, is void as to creditors of such debtor at the
suit of any creditor. In a suit brought by a creditor of such debtor for
the purpose of declaring such sale void, a receiver may be appointed
who shall take charge of all the assets of such debtor, including the
property so sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, and
also administer all the assets of the debtor for the equal benefit of the
creditors of the debtor in proportion to the amount of their respective
demands, including those which are unmatured.
Section 1313.57 states,
§ 1313.57: Knowledge of fraudulent intent material; mortgage in good
faith. Section 1313.56 of the Revised Code does not apply unless the
person to whom such sale conveyance, transfer, mortgage, or
assignment is made, knew of such fraudulent intent on the part of such
debtor. Said section does not vitiate or affect any mortgage made in
good faith to secure any debt or liability created simultaneously with
such mortgage, if such mortgage is filed for record in the county
wherein the property is situated or as otherwise provided by law,
within three days after its execution, and when, upon foreclosure or
taking possession of such property the mortgagee fully accounts for the
proceeds therein.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1313.56 & 1313.57 (Baldwin 1979).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
[20:863
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the avoiding powers provided for under federal law, such as section
547, but the trustee can also add to the bankruptcy estate any assets that
were transferred by the debtor before bankruptcy in a transaction
which could have been avoided under state law by an unsecured
creditor.4 The Ohio preference law is such a state law. Therefore, a
bankruptcy trustee in an Ohio bankruptcy case, unlike bankruptcy
trustees in nearly every other state, has two alternative preference
theories to bring to bear against creditors that have received assets
from a debtor before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Since the
Ohio preference law can be applied to transactions that would escape
avoidance under Bankruptcy Code section 547, a bankruptcy trustee
in Ohio has the potential to be a more powerful representative of
general unsecured creditors than trustees in most other jurisdictions.
This potential Ohio advantage, however, seems to have been
generally overlooked. Sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 are rarely
invoked. Yet it appears their use could have made a difference in the
outcome in some recent cases.' Moreover, with the increasing use of
4. "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim...." 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)
(1988). In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, where a trustee is not normally
appointed, the debtor would be able to exercise both the Ohio and federal
preference avoiding powers. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
In states with preference statutes which are not of general application, use
of the statute in conjunction with § 544(b) may be inhibited by limits built into
the state law itself. See supra note 1. Thus, the Pennsylvania statute can not be
invoked in a federal bankruptcy case unless the preference was followed within
120 days by an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Copter, Inc. v. Gladwin
Leasing, Inc., 725 F.2d 37 (3rd Cir. 1984). Compare Zimmerman v. Frem Corp.
(In re Kenval Mktg. Corp.), 69 Bankr. 922 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (permitting
trustee to use § 544(b) to avoid what an "assignee" but not a "creditor," as
specified in § 544(b), could avoid under the state preference law). No such
technical difficulties are presented by the Ohio Revised Code sections 1313.56
and 1313.57.
See Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part II),
47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 661-62 (1972).
5. NLRB v. Martin Arsham Sewing Co., 873 F.2d 888, reh'g denied, 882
F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Hartley, 52 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
See also In re Hollar, 100 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
In Martin Arsham, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the NLRB's
petition to enforce an order imposing personal liability for a backpay award on
the sole shareholder of a corporation. The corporation had gone through
bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy, the stockholder had taken a security interest
and assets from the corporation as security for an antecedent debt. The court
said that the NLRB should have suggested recovery against the stockholder in
(continued)
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the bankruptcy case on the basis of fraudulent conveyance law. 873 F.2d at 886,
n.1. Further, to let the NLRB recover after bankruptcy would give it a priority
not warranted by the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 888. On rehearing, however, the
court said, "No claim is made that the corporation did not owe Arsham the
money. It was only the Bankruptcy Act which made the repayment of this
antecedent debt apreference which could be set aside." 882 F.2d 216 (emphasis
added). The debt was secured; however, the only preferential transfer
avoidable under federal or state law was the grant of the security interest, which
had been made on account of an antecedent debt. The security interest had been
perfected 32 months before bankruptcy. Therefore, it was Ohio preference law,
not "Bankruptcy Act" preference law, which might have avoided it. The trustee
had not invoked Ohio preference law, however, in the bankruptcy proceeding.
In Hartley, the bankruptcy trustee tried to avoid the debtor's pledge of
corporate stock to a bank creditor to cover overdrafts. The trustee relied on
federal preference law and federal fraudulent conveyance law and lost on both
theories. The preference argument lost because the pledge occurred between
ninety days and one year before bankruptcy, and the trustee's characterization
of the transferee as an insider was rejected. (Under federal preference law, a
preference can be avoided only if it occurs within ninety days before
bankruptcy, unless the transferee is an "insider" and a one-year "reach back"
period applies. § 547(b)(4XB)). The fraudulent conveyance case under § 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code lost because 1) the antecedent debt incurred in running up
the overdrafts was adequate consideration for the conveyance, and 2) the court
followed cases in other jurisdictions holding that the debtor's intent to prefer,
coupled with the bank creditor's knowing receipt of the preference, did not turn
the transaction into a fraudulent conveyance. That kind of evidence in Ohio,
however, would have established an Ohio preference, and the Ohio preference
would have been voidable even though it occurred more than ninety days
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The trustee, however, apparently
made no argument based on Ohio preference law.
In Hollar, a $2000 debt repayment made to the debtor's "girlfriend and
future fiancee" more than 90 days, but less than one year, before the bankruptcy
petition escaped avoidance under § 547 because the court found that the
girlfriend was not an "insider." The debtor's intent to prefer and his girlfriend's
knowledge of it were irrelevant under federal law and were not discussed; the
nature of the relationship between the debtor and the transferee suggest that
exploration of the intent and knowledge issues might have been fruitful for the
trustee, had § 1313.56 been invoked.
In other cases, it is possible that application of Ohio preference law would
have yielded greater preference recoveries because transfers made earlier than
90 days before bankruptcy, as well as within 90 days of bankruptcy, could have
been recovered. See, eg., In re Circleville Distributing Co., 84 Bankr. 502 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988).
[20:863
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bankruptcy courts for the disposition of insolvency cases, the
bankruptcy court is probably the most likely venue for invocation of
Ohio's preference law in the future.6
This article traces the origins and history of sections 1313.56 and
1313.57 and, in so doing, delineates the scope of the power that
creditors (and bankruptcy trustees) have under Ohio preference law.
It then compares the elements of an Ohio preference with the elements
of a federal preference. From a bankruptcy trustee's perspective, the
state law has one significant advantage and several disadvantages.
The major advantage is that preferences which have occurred
several years before bankruptcy can be avoided; the comparable
period under federal law is ninety days, or, in some limited
circumstances, one year.7 The disadvantages are that, to invoke the
state law, the trustee must identify some creditor who, in fact, has a
section 1313.56 claim; preferences in the form of money payments
may not be avoidable at all (but the law on this point is not clear); and
subjective mental elements must be established (the debtor's intent to
prefer and the creditor's knowledge of it), which have no explicit
counterparts in federal law.
While this article compares the federal and state preference rules,
evaluating the practical significance of the differences between them,
the relative strength of the two laws is less important than the fact that
the bankruptcy trustee can choose whichever of the two laws is more
effective with respect to any given prebankruptcy transaction. Thus,
both laws might be applied in the same case, each to a separate
transfer. Therefore, the real test of the importance of the Ohio
preference law will have to be made in the courts when and if trustees
begin to exercise this neglected avoidance power. This article may
stimulate that process. A priori, however, it would appear that having
two preference theories to apply is better than having only one.
6. Bankruptcy filings increased from 331,098 to 782,960 between 1980
and 1990. Federal Judicial Workload Statistics, Dec. 31, 1990, Administrative
O'fice of the United States Courts, p. 11. There were 20,783 Chapter 11 filings,
most of which represent business failures, in 1990, an increase of 14% over 1989.
IL
7. The advantage can be highly significant. See text accompanying notes
110-21, infi-a, with respect to the Deprizio case.
19911
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I. STATUTORY HISTORY
A. Nineteenth-Century Origins
Preference law first appeared in the Ohio statutes in 1835.' At that
time, some transfers in trust by insolvents for the benefit of fewer
than all their creditors were already unenforceable under Ohio
common law.9 It was not their preferential character, however, that
made such transfers unlawful. Other factors were objectionable, such
as the debtor's retention of the possibility of getting back what was
transferred, or the imposition of a requirement that creditors give the
debtor a complete release from liability in order to participate in the
division of the trust assets. 10 The objectionable terms meant that,
while the debtor might not actually pay anyone, the transfer to a
trustee put the debtor's property beyond the reach of other creditors."
8. An Act to amend the act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery.
Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio,
That all assignments of property hereafter made by debtors to trustees
in consideration of insolvency and with design to secure one class of
creditors and defraud others shall be held to enure to the benefit of all
the creditors of the assignor, in proportion to their demands, and such
trusts shall be subject to the control of Chancery as in other cases, and
the court, if need be, may require security of the trustees for the faithful
execution of the trusts, or remove them and take the execution thereof
upon itself as justice may require.
1835 Ohio Laws 13, § 1.
See William H. Rose & Paul Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors,
Ohio Law and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 571 (1948), n.88.
9. Atkinson & Rollins v. Jordan Ellis & Co., 5 Ohio 293 (1832).
10. Id at 304.
11. In Atkinson, the court stated,
It seems to us clear . . . that the clause in the assignment ...
prohibiting any creditor from availing himself of any portion, except
within ninety days he executed a release for his whole debt, is a
manifest attempt, on the part of these debtors, to place all their property
beyond the reach of creditors, by ordinary legal process, and coerce
from them a release of their entire demands upon the possible
contingency of realizing something out of the effects, after the
expenses, securities, and preferred creditors are satisfied, and as such is
void against creditors. The case before us is a strong one to show the
injustice of such proceedings. The debtor, the trustees, and only three or
four of a large number of creditors have executed the assignment,
while, by its operation, property to the amount of nineteen thousand
dollars, is held under it beyond the reach of legal process. An effort is
(continued)
[20:863
HeinOnline  -- 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 868 1991
OHIO'S PREFERENCE LAW IN BANKRUPTCY
The Ohio courts did not draw the analogy, but it would appear that
setting up such a trust was akin to other tactics for evading creditor
process, long recognized as "acts of bankruptcy," which brought down
on debtors the force of early punitive bankruptcy laws. 2
By contrast, a forthright, no-strings-attached transfer to a
preferred creditor was tolerated."3 Granting such a direct preference
was a debtor's right; getting a preference was a diligent creditor's
reward. 4 Yet, at the same time, if neither the debtor nor creditor had
taken steps to create a preference, equity favored equality among
creditors and the equal division of an insolvent's assets.'"
The 1835 statute's targeting of those trusts intended "to secure one
class of creditors and defraud others" indicates that the legislature
identified preferential trusts with the misconduct of a debtor who puts
assets beyond the reach of other creditors and thus defrauds them.
The purpose of the law, however, was not to specify what was wrong,
but to provide a better remedy for the wrong than that provided by the
made by it to procure releases from the general creditors, without the
possibility of their obtaining one cent. The preferred creditors alone,
who are postponed until the expenses, securities, and fees are paid,
have claims upon this nineteen thousand dollars for upward of thirty
thousand dollars? Can this be considered as fairly devoting the
property of insolvent debtors to the payment of their debts?
Atkinson, 5 Ohio at 304.
12. See, e.g., The Statute of Bankrupts, 13 Elizabeth, c.7 (1570) made
keeping to one's house, or leaving the realm, "acts of bankruptcy." See Louis
Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223
(1918).
13. Stevenson v. Agry, 7 Ohio (pt.2) 247 (1836).
14. "It seems, therefore, nothing more than the exercise of the legal right of
a debtor to prefer one creditor to another, and the creditor thus preferred, reaps
no other harvest than the law secures to the vigilant." Id. at 249.
15. In 1844, the court stated,
Naked justice between creditors consists in an equal distribution of the
debtor's property among all, in the same proportion. The law
sometimes protects preferences either to encourage vigilance, or to
leave the acts of parties uncontrolled, when not directly wrong; but the
rule of equity is the rule of equality, whenever it can exert its power;
and it is this rule which the statute endeavors to follow, when it
operates upon assignments.
Bancroft v. Blizzard, 13 Ohio 30, 40 (1844). The "statute" referred to was the
1838 reenactment; see infra note 17.
1991]
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courts.'6 For, absent the statute, the particular creditor who objected to
the debtor's attempt to cut off access to assets would have recovered the
asset itself and thus received a preference. Instead, under the statute,
equity's goal of equal sharing among all creditors would be achieved:
the transfer would stand, but the trust created would be administered
by the Chancery court on behalf of all the creditors. Thus, the 1835
statute reflected the tension in official attitude toward preferences;
preferences were tolerated when debtors exercised the freedom to
grant them or creditors exercised the vigilance to take them, but
preferences were not acceptable when courts awarded them to
prevailing plaintiffs as remedies for debtor misconduct.
In 1838, the statute was amended and reenacted, and a "design to
prefer," literally, was proscribed for the first time.17 In the courts,
however, the idea that prevailed was that the statute's real target was a
16. See the suggestion to this effect made by the codifier, Revised Statutes
c.1290 (Curwen 1853), footnote 1, p.2239.
17. Section 3 states,
Sec. 3. Assignments of property in trust, which shall be made by
debtors to trustees in contemplation of insolvency, with the design to
prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion of others, shall be held to
enure to the benefit of all the creditors in proportion to their respective
demands; and such trusts shall be subject to the control of chancery, as
in other cases, and the court, if need be, may require security of the
trustees for the faithful execution of the trusts, or remove them and
appoint others, as justice may require." 1838 Ohio Laws 56, 57, § 3.
The 1838 statute was reenacted in substantially the same form in 1853.
An Act Declaring the effect of assignments to Trustees, in
contemplation of Insolvency. Section 1. Be it enacted by the General
Assembly of the State of Ohio, That all assignments of property in trust,
which shall be made by debtors to trustees in contemplation of
insolvency, with the design to prefer one or more creditors, to the
exclusion of others, shall be held to enure to the benefit of all the
creditors, in proportion to their respective demands, and such trusts
shall be subject to the control of the courts, which may require security
of the trustees for the faithful execution of the trusts, or remove them
and appoint others, as justice may require.
"Sec. 2. That this act shall take effect on the first day of July, eighteen
hundred and fifty-three." 1853 Ohio Laws 463, Act of March 14, 1853. This
repealed the Act of March 14, 1838, "the act directing the mode of proceeding in
chancery." 1853 Ohio Laws 163. The March 14, 1853 law is also at Revised
Statutes c.1290, §§ 1 & 2, at pp. 2239-40(Curwen 1853).
[20:863
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debtor's attempt to put assets out of reach of creditors by means of a
trust. 8 Judicial emphasis on assignments in trust reflected not only
the precise words of the statute, but also the continuing attitude that
what was wrong was not granting or taking a preference but using a
trust to put assets beyond the reach of other creditors. A trust for the
benefit of less than all creditors, when created by an insolvent, was
equated with such an attempt to evade creditor process. An outright
grant, not in trust, was enforceable even though preferential. 9 When
some creditors, through their vigilance, got more than a pro rata share
of an insolvent debtor's assets, a "just preference" was the result, and
the courts did not interfere.2 °
In 1859, the legislature repealed the 183821 statute and replaced it
with a preference law that was part of a comprehensive legislative
treatment of assignments for the benefit of creditors.22 In the same
18. Doremus v. O'Harra, 1 Ohio St. 45 (1852) (declining to follow Mitchel v.
Gazzam, 12 Ohio 315 (1843) which had given the statute a broader reading);
Atkinson v. Tomlinson, 1 Ohio St. 237 (1853); Webb v. Brown, 3 Ohio St. 246
(1854); Harkraider v. Leiby, 4 Ohio St. 602 (1855); Dickson v. Rauson, 5 Ohio St.
218 (1855); Bagaley & Co. v. Waters, 7 Ohio St. 360 (1857); Justice v. Uhl, 10
Ohio St. 170 (1859).
19. In Atkinson, the court reasoned,
We suppose that the legislature, as the language imports, intended to
provide for a case where a trustee is interposed, with the controlling
intent on the part of the debtor, of giving one creditor an advantage
over another, and that the statute does not apply to the case of a
creditor seeking and obtaining, in good faith, a lien on the property of
the debtor for the purpose of securing his debt.
Atkinson v. Tomlinson, 1 Ohio St. at 243 (1853).
20. Webb v. Brown, 3 Ohio St. 247, 262 (1854).
21. It had been re-enacted in substantially the same form in 1853. See
supra note 17.
22. 1859 Ohio Laws 56, "An Act Regulating (sic) the mode of administering
assignments in trust for the benefit of creditors." The relevant parts of the 1859
text provided
Sec.16 All assignments in trust to a trustee or trustees, made in
contemplation of insolvency, with the intent to prefer one or more
creditors, shall inure to the equal benefit of all creditors in proportion to
the amounts of their respective claims, and the trusts arising under the
same shall be administered in conformity with the provisions of this act.
Sec.17 All transfers, conveyance or assignments made with the
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall inure to the equal
benefit of all creditors in proportion to the amounts of their respective
(continued)
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1859 enactment, the legislature also provided for the avoidance of
fraudulent conveyances. The law thus acquired the basic features
that it has retained up until the present time, voiding both preferences
and fraudulent conveyances and allowing for the appointment of a
receiver. The statute was further revised in 1863 with respect to
fraudulent conveyances23 and minor revisions were made in 1878.24
By 1880, the fraudulent conveyance law was codified as section 6344
and the preference law as section 6343 of the Revised Statutes.25
Judicial interpretation of the preference statute was the same
before and after these revisions. According to the courts, the only
preferences to which the statute applied were assignments made in
trust.26  Under the statute it remained an individual debtor's
prerogative to grant preferences to preferred creditors, so long as the
recipient of the preferential transfer was paid and did not merely hold
claims, and the probate judge, after any such transfer, conveyance or
assignment shall have been made with the intent aforesaid, on the
application of any creditor, shall appoint an assignee according to the
provisions of this act, who, upon being duly qualified, shall proceed by
due course of law to recover possession of all property so transferred,
conveyed or assigned, and to administer the same as in other cases of
assignments to trustees for the benefit of creditors.
The function of the preference provision, within the larger law on
assignments for the benefit of creditors, was to turn assignments for the benefit
of preferred creditors into the kind of assignment for all creditors that the statute
regulated. However, only the property actually assigned by the debtor in the
preferential trust was to be administered for the benefit of all creditors; other
property of the debtor not made part of the preferential trust was not affected.
23. 1863 Ohio Laws 8.
24. 1878 Ohio Laws 935, 938 stated,
Sec. 9. All assignments in trust to a trustee or trustees, made in
contemplation of insolvency, with the intent to prefer one or more
creditors, shall inure to the equal benefit of all creditors, in proportion to
the amount of their respective claims, and the trusts arising under the
same shall be administered in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.
25. REVISED STATUTES §§ 6343, 6344 (1880).
26. Cross v. Carstens, 31 N.E. 506,507 (1892); Citizens Natl Bank v. Wehrle,
9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 330 (Erie Cir. Ct. 1897). At the turn of the century, the statute's
focus, according to the courts, continued to be on debtor efforts to put assets
beyond the reach of creditors.
872, [20:863
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the property, as a trustee would, for others.27 Yet, at the same time the
courts were developing a different, nonstatutory, nontolerant,
antipreference common law applicable, not to individuals, but to
corporations and partnerships. 1 In the next legislative development,
the older, narrower, and relatively more tolerant policy toward
individual debtors who granted preferences was replaced by rules
more like those that the courts were applying to business entities.
B. Turn-of-the-Century Developments
In 1898, Revised Statutes sections 6343 and 6344 were completely
rewritten. The fraud and preference provisions were both placed in
section 6343.29 The new section 6344 provided for the appointment of a
27. "The right of preference rests upon the natural right to acquire and
control property. Thejus disponendi is necessarily an element of ownership. To
authorize the citizen to acquire property would be of little use if he had not the
corresponding right to dispose of it." Cross v. Carstens, 31 N.E. at 510. "[Iln Ohio
a failing debtor, knowing his insolvency, and in contemplation of assigning for
the benefit of creditors, has a right to prefer one or more creditors to others, if he
does so in good faith and hinders other creditors no more than is incidental to
the preference [made] .. " Id.
28. Rouse v. Merchant's Natl Bank, 22 N.E. 293 (Ohio 1889); Damarin v.
Huron Iron Co., 26 N.E. 37 (Ohio 1890); Benedict v. Market Nat'l Bank, 10 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 505 (Hamilton Cir. Ct. 1890); See also Bosche v. Toledo Display Horse
Co., 7 Ohio Cir.Dec. 374 (Lucas Cir. Ct. 1897); First Natl Bank v. McKinney, 9
Ohio Cir. Dec. 1 (Cuyahoga Cir. Ct. 1898); Kit Carter Cattle Co. v. McGillin, 11
Ohio Cir. Dec. 413 (Cuyahoga Cir. Ct. 1900).
29. 1898 Ohio Laws 290. The two sections were amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 6343. Every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage or
assignment, whether made in trust or otherwise, by a debtor or debtors,
and every judgment suffered by him or them, and every act or device
done or resorted to by him or them, in contemplation of insolvency, or
with a design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion in whole
or part of others, and every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage, or
assignment made, or judgment suffered by a debtor or debtors, or
procured by him or them to be made, in any manner, with intent to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall be declared void as to creditors
of such debtor or debtors, at the suit of any creditor or creditors, as
hereinafter provided, and shall operate as an assignment and transfer
of all the property and effects of such debtor or debtors, and shall inure
to the equal benefit of all creditors of such debtor or debtors in
proportion to the amount of their respective demands, including those
which are unmatured. And every such sale, conveyance, transfer,
(continued)
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 873 1991
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
trustee in cases of both preferences and fraud;3" under the earlier
codification, the appointment of an "assignee" had been called for
only in cases of fraud. Four other significant changes were brought
about by the 1898 amendments. First, the category of property
dispositions subject to preference avoidance was expanded to include,
in addition to assignments, "every sale, conveyance, transfer or
mortgage or assignment made, and every such judgment suffered, and
every such act or device done or resorted to, by any debtor or debtors,
in the event of a deed of assignment being filed within ninety (90) days
after the giving or doing of such thing or act, shall be conclusively
deemed and held to be fraudulent, and shall be held to be void as to the
assignee of such debtor or debtors, whereupon proof shown, such
debtor or debtors was or were actually insolvent at the time of the
giving or doing of such act or thing, whether he or they had knowledge
of such insolvency or not. Provided, that nothing in this section
contained shall vitiate or affect any mortgage made in good faith to
secure any debt or liability created simultaneously with such mortgage,
if the same be filed for record in the county wherein the property is
situated, or as otherwise provided by law, within three (3) days after its
execution, and where upon foreclosure or taking possession of such
property the mortgagee fully accounts for the proceeds of such
property.
Sec. 6344. Any creditor or creditors, as to whom any of the acts or
things prohibited in the preceding section are void, whether the claim of
such creditor or creditors has matured or will thereafter mature, may
commence an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to have such
act or things declared void, and such court shall appoint a trustee
according to the provisions of this chapter, who upon being duly
qualified shall proceed by due course of law to recover possession of all
property so sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, and to
administer the same for the equal benefit of all creditors, as in other
cases of assignments to trustees for the benefit of creditors. And any
assignee as to whom any thing or act mentioned in the preceding
section shall be void, shall likewise commence a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction to recover possession of all property so sold,
conveyed, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, and shall administer the
same for the equal benefit of all creditors as in other cases of
assignments to trustees for the benefit of creditors; provided, that
where such assignee fails or declines, upon notice by any creditor or
creditors to institute such suit, such creditor or creditors may
themselves institute such suit within five days after serving notice upon
such assignee to commence such suit, and the procedure and
administration shall be the same as is herein before provided for suits
commenced by any creditor or creditors.
30. When appointed, the § 6344 trustee was to administer only the property
preferentially or fraudulently assigned. Id.
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mortgage," "every judgment suffered," and "every act or device
resorted to" by the debtor.3 Second, such sales, conveyances,
transfers, mortgages, and assignments were covered by the amended
provision, whether they were made "in trust or otherwise." Third, the
new law provided that, if any proscribed "act or device" were followed
within ninety days by a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, then the earlier and preferential disposition was
"conclusively deemed" to be fraudulent and void.3 2 Lastly, the 1898
amendments provided that a voidable preference or fraud operated as
a transfer of all the debtor's property, not only the property
preferentially or fraudulently transferred, for the benefit of all
creditors. Before 1898, only the property preferentially or
fraudulently transferred was administered for the benefit of all
creditors."3
In 1902, *a further revision added language making the
transferee's knowledge of the debtor's "intent to defraud" a condition
of voidability. 3 4 Since the new language applied whether the
31. Id. at 30.
32. This statutory imputation of wrongdoing to the debtor, tied to the
initiation of an insolvency proceeding within the next 90 days, was deleted soon
thereafter. See the 1902 revision, infra note 34.
33. The new § 6343 also, and anomalously, made any of these debtor
actions voidable if done either "in contemplation of insolvency, or with a design
to prefer." A 1902 revision removed the probably inadvertent "or" from § 6343
making the language read, "Every... transfer ... made ... in contemplation of
insolvency, and with a design to prefer." (emphasis added). See infra note 34.
34. As amended in 1902, § 6343 provided as follows:
Every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage or assignment, made in
trust or otherwise by a debtor or debtors, and every judgment suffered by
him or them against himself or themselves in contemplation of insolvency,
and with a design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion in whole
or in part of others, and every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage or
assignment made, or judgment procured by him or them to be rendered, in
any manner, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall be
declared void as to creditors of such debtor or debtors at the suit of any
creditor or creditors as hereinafter provided, and shall operate as an
assignment and transfer of all the property and effects of such debtor or
debtors, and shall inure to the equal benefit of such creditor or creditors in
proportion to the amount of their respective demands, including those
which are unmatured. Provided, however, that the provisions of this
section shall not apply unless the person or persons to whom such sale,
conveyance, transfer, mortgage or assignment be made, knew of such
fraudulent intent on the part of such debtor or debtors, and provided
further, that nothing in this section contained, shall vitiate or affect any
(continued)
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plaintiffs case was based on preference or fraud, this change,
dealing as it did with only what the transferee knew about the debtor's
"intent to defraud," did not harmonize with the rest of the statute.3 5
The 1902 revision also eliminated the reference to general
assignments for the benefit of creditors which might occur within the
ninety days following the preference.3"
The 1898-1902 amendments transformed Ohio preference law.
The expanded categories of covered transfers, and the coverage of
such transfers whether they were made "in trust or otherwise,"
clearly added to the types of property dispositions susceptible to
avoidance.37 Much more significantly, however, the latter change
also disconnected preference law from its origins as a device to
combat debtor efforts to defeat creditor process by setting up a trust.
Since trusts were no longer the focal point of the preference statute, the
change meant that a preference was no longer just a shorthand
description of a certain method, involving the use of trusts, which
some debtors had used to prevent creditor access to assets.
Preferences had been declared wrong in themselves. This change
itself was directly related to, and best understood in connection with,
the part of the amendment making all of a debtor's property (not just
the part preferentially transferred) subject to pro rata distribution
among all the debtor's creditors. That change contemplated a
mortgage made in good faith to secure any debt or liability created
simultaneously with such mortgage, if such mortgage be filed for record in
the county wherein the property is situated, or as otherwise provided by
law, within three (3) days after its execution, and where, upon foreclosure
or taking possession of such property, the mortgagee fully accounts for the
proceeds of such property.
1902 Ohio Laws 608.
35. The Ohio Supreme Court later repaired the drafting damage in
Carruthers v. Kennedy, 166 N.E. 801 (Ohio 1929). See infra text at notes 73-74.
36. See supra note 34.
37. In 1910, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
The difference between the old [pre-1898] section and the new [post-
1902] one is that the former declared that assignments made to a trustee
in contemplation of insolvency and with intent to prefer or delay
creditors should inure to the equal benefit of all creditors... while the
latter declares all instruments, including assignments that are made in
trust or otherwise by a debtor. . . shall be declared void....
In re Farrell, 176 Fed. 505, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1910).
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collective state liquidation proceeding of all the debtor's assets,
triggered by a preference.
It is in the context of such a collective insolvency proceeding that
modern preference law, which treats a preference as a preference and
not as a merely deviant use of a trust, makes sense. For preference
law today is a deterrent device, intended to dissuade debtors and
creditors from attempting to gain individual advantages, the
achievement of which will reduce the total pool of assets available for
distribution among all creditors in the collective insolvency case that
follows."8 In that context, the function of preference law is to preserve
the advantage of a collective proceeding for creditors as a class, and
not to protect creditors against the efforts of a debtor to put assets
beyond their reach. Preference law served that earlier function in the
free-for-all race for assets which characterized debtor-creditor
relations in the absence of a bankruptcy-type collective insolvency
proceeding. It was in that pre-1898 context that Ohio's policy favoring
a debtor's freedom to dispose of property, even if preferentially, and
reward a creditor's diligence, made sense. But the logic of a modern
collective insolvency proceeding, a proceeding that includes
preference avoidance, necessarily subordinates the nineteenth-
century policy of tolerance for debtor-creditor freedom of action.
This change in Ohio preference law in 1898 is even more fully
understandable in light of the federal development that was occurring
at the same time: in 1898, Congress was putting a federal bankruptcy
law back on the books. Extrinsic evidence in the federal reports
indicates that the Ohio amendments of 1898 were influenced by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898."9 Internal evidence of the affinity can also be
38. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
125-26 (1986).
39. See Irwin v. Maple (In re Gaskill), 252 Fed. 10 (6th Cir. 1918).
These [Ohio preference] provisions disclose some legislative
purposes that cannot well be mistaken. A number of transactions are
now denounced as preferences in addition to the one forbidden by the
old statute. It is worthy of notice that this change originated in 1898 (93
O.L. 290), the year in which the federal bankruptcy statute was enacted;
and in view of some features of resemblance between the two
enactments, as, for instance, those in relation to preferences, it is not too
much to say that the two legislative bodies were in these respects
moved by the same considerations; nor can well-considered
interpretations that have been placed upon the federal or the state
provisions of kindred character be safely ignored, when passing upon
either the one or the other. Considering the statutory changes made in
Ohio, they serve to show the purpose of the new statute .... This
enlargement in scope discloses a legislative purpose to establish a
(continued)
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 877 1991
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
found: the establishment in 1898 of a "reach-back" period before the
making of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, during which
time preferences were "conclusively deemed" void, seems patterned
on the Bankruptcy Act's model. However, the elimination in 1902 of
that reference to a later assignment for the benefit of creditors clearly
indicates that the Ohio policy against preferences was not limited to
situations in which they were followed by such general
assignments.40
Changes subsequent to the 1898-1902 revisions were modest and
nonsubstantive. In 1910, the relevant parts41 of sections 6343 and 6344
became sections 11104 and 11105 of the Ohio General Code.4" The
fraud and preference laws from section 6343 were kept together in
section 11104, to which was added a provision for the possible
appointment of a "receiver" (formerly referred to as a "trustee").
The receiver was to administer all the debtor's assets, not only the
assets preferentially or fraudulently transferred, for the benefit of all
creditors. The part of section 6343 dealing with transferee knowledge
became section 11105. Except for minor stylistic variations, General
Code sections 11104 and 11105 are the same as sections 1313.56 and
1313.57 of the Ohio Revised Code, the Ohio preference law as it now
appears on the books.43 Thus, in statutory terms, the elements of an
comprehensive rule of equality in place of the old system of inequality
in the distribution of an insolvent's assets among his creditors.
Id at 18.
40. Application of the Ohio preference law was never restricted to
situations in which a general assignment for the benefit of creditors had
occurred; many states have laws which are so limited. See supra note 1.
41. The provision in § 6344 for the appointment of a receiver to administer
the preferentially or fraudulently transferred assets (but not all the rest of the
debtor's assets) became § 11106.
42. OHIO GENERAL CODE §§ 11104 and 11105 (1910); see Carruthers v.
Kennedy, 166 N.E. 801, 802 (Ohio 1929). Additionally, a nonrelevant
amendment in 1908 was enacted which temporarily added a bulk sales law to §
6343; this bulk sales law later became Ohio General Code § 11102 and was
declared unconstitutional in Williams & Thomas Co. v. Preslo, 95 N.E. 900 (Ohio
1911).
43. Section 11104 stated,
Sec. 11104. Receiver, appointment of. A sale, conveyance, transfer,
mortgage, or assignment, made in trust or otherwise, by a debtor or debtors, and
every judgment suffered by him or them against himself or themselves in
contemplation of insolvency and with a design to prefer one or more creditors to
the exclusion in whole or in part of others, and a sale, conveyance, transfer,
mortgage, or assignment made, or judgment procured by him or them to be
(continued)
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Ohio avoidable preference have remained the same since early in
this century.
Under the current Revised Code, a property disposition, which was
made in contemplation of insolvency with a design to prefer one or
more creditors, who knew of the debtor-transferor's intent to
"defraud," can be voided by a creditor, if the creditor's suit is brought
in a timely fashion. In such a suit, a receiver may be appointed by the
court.4 4 The next section of this article examines each of these
elements and demonstrate how the judiciary, in this century as in the
last, has continued to play an important role in determining the
preference statutes' meaning and practical significance.
II. ELEMENTS OF AN OHIO PREFERENCE
A. A Property Disposition
While the 1898 amendments had clearly expanded the scope and
the function of the Ohio preference law, the part of the amendment
rendered, in any manner, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, shall
be void as to creditors of such debtor, or debtors at the suit of any creditor or
creditors. In a suit brought by a creditor or creditors of such debtor or debtors
for the purpose of declaring such sale void, a receiver may be appointed who
shall take charge of all the assets of such debtor or debtors, including the
property so sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, and also
administer all the assets of the debtor or debtors for the equal benefit of the
creditors of the debtor or debtors in proportion to the amount of their respective
demands, including those which are unmatured.
OHIO GENERAL CODE (1938).
Section 11105 stated,
Sec. 11105. Knowledge of fraudulent intent, material; mortgage, provisions
as to. The provisions of the next preceding section shall not apply unless the
person or persons to whom such sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage or
assignment is made, knew of such fraudulent intent on the part of such debtor or
debtors, nor shall anything in such section vitiate or affect any mortgage made
in good faith, to secure any debt or liability created simultaneously with such
mortgage, if such mortgage be filed for record in the county wherein the
property is situated, or as otherwise provided by law, within three days after its
execution, and when, upon foreclosure or taking possession of such property,
the mortgagee fully accounts for the proceeds thereof.
Ohio General Code (1938).
44. OHIo REV. CODE ANN §§ 1313.56 and 1313.57.
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adding sales, conveyances, transfers, mortgages, acts and devices,
and judgments to the assignments initially targeted by the statute was
soon given a highly restrictive reading by the Ohio Supreme Court. In
1903, in National Bank of Commerce v. Gettinger,5 the court held, on
alternative grounds, that a preferential transfer made in 1901 was
not avoidable. The first ground was that the transferee was in good
faith and unaware of the debtor-transferor's purposes. Inasmuch as
knowing participation in the preference by the transferee became an
explicit statutory condition for avoidance under the 1902 amendment,
the court's holding on this point adds little to the statute's meaning
today. The other ground for the decision, however, is remarkable.
The court stated that direct money payments to a preferred creditor
were not covered by the statute. It reasoned that, if "payments" had
been intended to be covered, the legislature would have said so
expressly and listed "payments" among other modes of disposition
recently added to the statute. As the opinion explained,46
The Legislature having omitted the word 'payment,' this court
cannot read it into the statute by construction; and especially
is this true when we never had any legislation in this state
against receiving payment of honest claims, and when such a
construction would render the constitutionality of the act
doubtful.47
The court's reference to constitutionality was unexplained but
probably based on an apprehension that voiding the preference would
violate the Ohio Constitutional provisions on either due process or
equal protection.48
The Gettinger interpretation of the 1898 statutory language is
particularly surprising today because of the all-inclusive meaning
given the words "transfer" and "conveyance" in contemporary
statutes.49 But the court's narrow reading of the statute should have
45. 68 Ohio St. at 396-97.
46. "The word 'payment' is as familiar, and as well understood as the
words, 'sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage, or assignment,' and if the general
assembly had intended to legislate against payments, it would have used that
word." Id.
47. Id.
48. See references to these points in the argument of counsel in Gettinger,
68 Ohio St. at 396-97.
49. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, "'Conveyance'
includes every payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease,
mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of
any lien or encumbrance." Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 1, 7A U.L.A.
(continued)
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been equally surprising in 1903. For, as indicated above, the 1898
amendments to the preference law did not occur in a vacuum. It was a
modern preference law that Congress wrote in 1898, and such a
preference law that the Ohio Legislature was apparently trying to
write in the same year and in 1902. It was apparently not the
preference law for which the Ohio Supreme Court was ready in 1903,
in Gettinger, because money payments of antecedent debts are
obviously as incompatible with the policy behind a real preference law
as any other "conveyance" or "transfer" to which a debtor might
resort. Indeed, if any distinction is to be drawn among forms of
preferences, money payments are among the most objectionable. A
direct transfer of an asset, such as money, depletes a debtor's estate
and thereby increases the risk of the debtor's ultimate collapse.
Direct transfers of debtor assets are, therefore, more detrimental to
creditors collectively than the granting of a mortgage, which merely
redistributes debtor assets and does not diminish the debtor's
productivity on behalf of the creditors as a group.50
Is Gettinger still good law? Does section 1313.56 not make
avoidable what is probably the most common example of preferential
behavior, the simple paying of antecedent debts with money?
The evidence on the continued viability of Gettinger is mixed. As
noted above, its inherent weaknesses are manifest; the court reversed
the policy distinction between money payments and other kinds of
preferences, allowing the money payments to escape avoidance, while
voiding mortgages. The court's holding on money payments was
only an alternative basis for decision, and its constitutional
rationale is no longer persuasive because voiding a preference today
implicates neither due process nor equal protection.
427 (1985). The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides: 'Transfer' means
every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary,
of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance."
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 1(12), 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). In the words of
the Bankruptcy Code, "transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute
or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security
interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption. 11 U.S.C. §
101(50).
50. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY, (2d ed. 1990) 426; cf. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE
LoGIc AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 128 (1986).
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In Ohio, Gettinger has been followed only in cases in which there
were alternative bases for the results reached.51 In other words, no
preference has ever escaped avoidance under section 1313.56 solely
because it was a money payment.
Moreover, preferential money payments actually have been
avoided under sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 in federal court. The
federal cases, however, did not address the money payment issue.
Furthermore, they relied upon a combination of both sections 1313.56
and 1313.57 and corporate common law. In In re Berman,52 a
bankruptcy case, the Sixth Circuit stated that the referee correctly
summarized the law of Ohio as follows:
Ohio follows the rule that the property and assets of a
corporation constitute a trust fund for the payment of its debts,
and that an insolvent corporation which has ceased to do
business can not by transfer of its property to one of its
creditors in payment of antecedent debts create a valid
preference to that creditor over its other creditors. When such
a situation occurs, the property transferred may be traced and
recovered unless the holder is a bona fide purchaser for value,
and without notice.53
The court also cited both statutory and corporation preference cases. 5 4
The preference was avoided. The creditor had received an
51. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Fulton, 19 Ohio Law Abstracts 70 (Ohio App. 1935).
"A preference created by an insolvent debtor by the payment of an honest debt
in cash or current exchange is lawful in Ohio, both under the common law and
under § 11104 of the General Code, since this section does not apply to
payment." Id. at 70. In Erie RR., the court also pointed out that the payment to a
depositor was in the ordinary course of business, and that the debtor-bank was
continuing to operate, although it was seized and liquidated several months later
by the superintendent of banks. Reliance on the debtor's intent to continue
operating meant the court had in mind law the developed in corporation
preference cases, pursuant to which it was not a preference to pay a bill so long
as the corporation had no intention of ceasing to operate. Thus the "payment"
point is diluted by this other factor. See Rouse v. Merchants' Natl Bank 22 N.E.
293 (Ohio 1889), and Damarin v. Huron Iron Co. 26 N.E. 37 (Ohio 1890).
52. 343 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1965).
53. Id. at 126-27.
54. The court cited Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); George T.
Smith Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U.S. 237 (1890); Carruthers v.
Kennedy, 166 N.E. 801 (1921); Rouse v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 22 N.E. 293
(1889); and In re Lee, 129 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
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assignment of a money claim against an insurance company, which
was tantamount to a cash payment."
Actual cash payments were avoided as preferential in Conroy v.
Schott, 6 in which the trustee in bankruptcy invoked sections 1313.56
and 1313.57 to avoid repayments" made to a preferred creditor who,
over a five-year period, had engaged in more than six hundred
separate transactions with a debtor running a Ponzi"8 scheme.
Checks were endorsed over to the preferee, and other repayments
came from the debtor's checking accounts."9 Gettinger was cited,
discussed, and distinguished in Conroy 60 but not with respect to the
"money payment" nature of the preferences received. In Conroy, the
Sixth Circuit looked to Gettinger only for what it had to say about the
preferee's defenses based on good faith and lack of knowledge.
The Sixth Circuit has also applied sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 to
money payments outside of bankruptcy, on behalf of the Internal
Revenue Service.6 '
There is no intrinsic reason why Ohio courts could not hear cases
to avoid preferential money payments. In Malone v. Summer Co.,62
the substantive preference law invoked was section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The bankruptcy trustee sued to recover the
preference in an Ohio trial court. The issue, resolved in the trustee's
favor, was whether Ohio courts could exercise jurisdiction over
money payment preference cases when the cases were based on
federal law. The Malone court noted that the meaning of the word
"conveyance" had expanded since the Gettinger decision in 1903;
Ohio had adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1961, in
which "conveyance" expressly includes "every payment of
55. "The 'payment' [in Berman] was not of cash or currency but there is a
striking resemblance to cold cash in such a claim." 244 N.E.2d 485, 492 (Ohio
App. 1968).
56. 363 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1966).
57. The trustee invoked both state law and § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. Section 70(e) was the counterpart in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 of the
present § 544(b).
58. "The term 'Ponzi scheme' designates an investment scam in which the
promoters of the investments promise the initial investors substantial returns
and then fund those returns by diverting the principal contributions of
subsequent investors." PETER ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS
6-51 (1989).
59. 363 F.2d at 92.
60. Id.
61. Delia v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Adams Bldg. Co., 531 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.1976).
62. 244 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio App. 1968).
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money."63 The broader definition of "conveyance" in the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act only applies, however, within that statute
itself; it does not purport to modify the meaning of "conveyance" as
used in section 1313.56, which is what the Gettinger court had
determined. Therefore, the holding in Malone is not inconsistent
with Gettinger.
Despite all indications of its weakness, Gettinger has never been
overruled. While not venerable, it is old precedent. It is arguable,
therefore, that money payment preferences are not avoidable under
section 1313.56. However, if section 1313.56 were to be applied in the
future as it has been already in the Sixth Circuit, Ohio preference law
would treat Gettinger's (alternative) money payment holding as an
archaic relic of nineteenth-century thinking misplaced in the context
of a modern collective insolvency proceeding."
B. Contemplation of Insolvency
"Insolvency" in section 1313.56 means the inability to pay debts
as they become due, rather than balance sheet insolvency.6 5
"Contemplation" of insolvency denotes awareness of either actual or
impending insolvency, which then motivates the making of a
transfer." A preferential transfer thus might occur before a debtor
63. See supra note 49. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act replaced the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Ohio in 1990. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1336.01-1336.11 (Baldwin 1991). As defined in the Uniforim Fraudulent
Transfer Act, "transfer includes "payment of money." Id. § 1336.01(L).
64. By the time Gettinger was decided, the United States Supreme Court
had already rejected the argument that money payments could not be federal
preferences. Pirie v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438 (1901) (holding
that "transfers of property" as used in section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
meant money payment preferences as well as all others). Pirie was apparently
not cited to the Ohio Supreme Court in Gettinger. See 68 Ohio St. at 396-97.
65. "[I]nsolvency exists when a person is unable to pay his debts according
to the ordinary usages of trade." Prose v. Beardsley, 18 Ohio App. 211, 216
(1924).
66. The federal district court stated,
'Insolvency in this law means an inability to pay debts as they become
due in the ordinary course of daily transactions, and if, from such a
deranged state of his affairs and a sense of inability to meet his
moneyed engagements, the debtor transfers property to a creditor, he is
regarded as having done so in contemplation of insolvency .... This
was Smith's situation, and all the facts surrounding the execution of the
mortgage show that he acted in view thereof and with the intent to
secure his existing indebtedness to Riker as well as to obtain a new loan
(continued)
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actually loses the capacity to meet current obligations.6 7
Circumstantial evidence can establish all elements of the preference,
including contemplation of insolvency.6
of $800. Likewise Riker had knowledge of facts that would charge him
with knowledge of Smith's insolvency in this sense and having
participated in that intent to create a preference. Riker knew that Smith
was hard up and short of cash. It is fairly inferable that he knew that by
reason thereof Smith was unable at that time to pay his debts in the
usual course of his daily transactions. He knew that Smith was unable
to pay his debt when it matured. He knew Smith's willingness to agree
to pay a commission of $375 for a new cash loan of $800. These facts
and other attendant circumstances produce the conviction that Riker
participated in Smith's forbidden intent, despite their present
disclaimers.'
In re Wright Industries, Inc., 93 F. Supp 58, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1950), quoting with
approval, Lyons, Trustee v. Riker, 29 Ohio Law Rep. 324 (1939).
67. The Ohio appellate court stated,
[I]t will be readily observed that the phrase relating to insolvency in
section 11104 long antedates the definition of solvency made by the
bankruptcy act, as the term appeared in the legislation of this state at
least eighty years ago. The definition of the term in the bankruptcy act,
therefore, has no application to the Ohio statute ....
... [The statute] does not denounce a deed made by an insolvent,
but one made in contemplation of insolvency .... [The statute] was
finally definitely determined that an act was in contemplation of
insolvency if it were performed because either existing or anticipated
insolvency were in the mind of the performer....
it . [The phrase] "in contemplation of insolvency," has endured; and
it means now, as it meant then, that one was in contemplation of
insolvency when he realized that either at the time or in the early future
his deranged financial condition was or would be such that he would be
unable to pay his debts as they became due.
Prose v. Beardsley, 18 Ohio App. 211, 217-18.
68. The federal district court stated,
The situation of the debtor making the assignment, and the design with
which he made it, must be gathered from all the circumstances in the
case. It is the motive, design, and situation of the assignor, that give
character to the assignment, and bring it within the operation of the
statute.
(continued)
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C. Design to Prefer
In one sentence, section 1313.56 regulates both the "design to
prefer" and the "intent to hinder, delay or defraud." They are distinct
offenses.6 9 A design or intent to prefer is not in itself fraudulent.7"
In re Wright Indus., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1950), quoting
Mitchell v. Gazzam 315, 336 (1873).
69. "A conveyance made with intent to defraud creditors is one thing, and a
conveyance to prefer creditors is another. The first imports moral turpitude, the
other is only a recently prohibited act. Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co.,
227 U.S. 575 (1913)." Prose v. Beardsley, 18 Ohio App. 211, 214-15 (1924).
"[T]he origins of the preference are quite different from those of the
fraudulent conveyance .... [I]t is not a fraudulent conveyance for a debtor to
prefer a particular creditor .... Thus the preference, as such, cannot be treated
as a fraudulent conveyance." GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES § 289, at 488-90 (1940).
Scholars advocating adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
in Ohio recommended against repealing the statutory predecessor to section
1313.56 because of its coverage of preferences in addition to fraudulent
conveyances. See William H. Rose & Paul 0. Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud of
Creditors, Ohio Law and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 571, 614 (1948).
70. In Coder v. Arts, the United States Supreme Court stated,
What is meant when it is required that such conveyances in order to be
set aside shall be made with the intent on the bankrupt's part to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors? This form of expression is familiar to the
law of fraudulent conveyances, and was used at the common law, and
in the statute of Elizabeth, and has always been held to require, in order
to invalidate a conveyance, that there shall be actual fraud; and it
makes no difference that the conveyance was made upon a valuable
consideration, if made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or
defrauding creditors. The question of fraud depends upon the motive..
. The mere fact that one creditor was preferred over another, or that
the conveyance might have the effect to secure one creditor and
deprive others of the means of obtaining payment, was not sufficient to
avoid a conveyance; but it was uniformly recognized that, acting in
good faith, a debtor might thus prefer one or more creditors....
We are of opinion that Congress, in ... using the terms "to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors," intended to adopt them in their well-known
meaning as being aimed at conveyances intended to defraud.
213 U.S. 223, 242 (1909) (citations omitted). The Missouri Supreme Court, in a
frequently cited case, also supported the view that an intent to prefer is not
necessarily fraudulent:
(continued)
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As indicated above,"' the debtor's design or intent to prefer can be
established by circumstantial evidence. For example, if the price of
new credit from a creditor is the securing of old and delinquent
obligations owed to the same creditor, an intent to prefer that creditor
can be inferred.72
D. The Transferee's Knowledge of the Debtor's "Fraudulent Intent"
Sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 are awkward partners because
section 1313.56 deals with both preferences and fraudulent
conveyances, while section 1313.57 makes the transfers described in
section 1313.56 avoidable only if the transferee has knowledge of the
transferor's "fraudulent intent." This language could mean that the
transferee's knowledge was a factor only in fraudulent conveyance
cases. It could also mean that preferences were avoidable under
section 1313.56 only if the debtor's "design to prefer" somehow
literally included "fraudulent intent." In 1929, the Ohio Supreme
The right of a debtor to prefer one creditor necessarily implies the right
of such creditor to keep such preference. While the effect of such
preference must, to the extent that it is made, necessarily be to defer or
to hinder or delay other creditors, the mere knowledge of the preferred
creditor that such will be its effect, and the debtor intended it should
have that effect, will not be sufficient to avoid the transaction as to the
creditor preferred.
Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74, 77 (1880).
71. See supra text at note 68.
72. Such intent to prefer was inferred by the Ohio appellate court:
R.C. 1313.56 clearly prohibits the mortgaging of property to a
creditor designed to be a preference over other creditors. The
mortgage given to appellant was to secure an antecedent debt owed by
the Coles to appellant. Prior to this mortgage, Mr. Cole had not made a
payment on the antecedent debt for approximately two years. From
the fact that Mr. Cole was delinquent on his payments to such a large
extent, it can be reasonably inferred that this mortgage was made in
contemplation of his insolvency. Mr. Cole's intentions were clear, the
only way for him to obtain credit was to give appellant a mortgage on
the property in question. He, therefore, had the requisite intent to prefer
one creditor to the exclusion in whole or part of other creditors.
Diamond Savings & Loan v. Cole, No. 5-85-24, Ohio App. Oct. 29, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file, App subfile).
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Court, in Carruthers v. Kennedy,7 3 resolved the matter by adopting the
reasonable but textually strained position that section 1313.57's
requirement that the transferee have knowledge of "fraudulent
intent" means knowledge of fraudulent intent in fraud cases, and
knowledge of "preferential" intent in preference cases.74 To have
held otherwise, or to have read an intent to defraud into the "design to
prefer," would have been inconsistent with the legislative
understanding that the design to prefer and the intent to defraud were
two separate offenses. This legislative understanding was evidenced
by the targeting of both preferences and fraudulent conveyances for
avoidance in section 1313.56. Any other interpretation would also
have been inconsistent with the historically recognized distinctions
between preferences and fraudulent conveyances.7" This difference
between fraud and preference has been recognized even though, in a
sense, every preference does to an extent "hinder or delay" the
creditors who are not the beneficiaries of the preference. But the
"hinder or delay" language, which comes down from the original
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, 76 has not been read to create or enlarge the scope
of the "fraudulent conveyance" idea to include conveyances that only
"hinder" and conveyances that only "delay."'7 7 In other words, a
fraudulent conveyance requires "fraud," and a preference, though it
may hinder or delay, is not a fraud.78 Intent to prefer is not equivalent
to intent to defraud.
As in the case of the other elements of an Ohio preference,
circumstantial evidence will support a finding that the transferee had
knowledge of the debtor's intent to prefer.7
73. 166 N.E. 801 (Ohio 1929).
74. In Carruthers, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
It is therefore the true meaning of section [1313.57] that no transaction
would be vitiated unless the purchaser knew of the design on the part of
the vendor to prefer the vendee to the exclusion of the other creditors,
or, if it was a transaction involving actual fraud, that he knew of the
intent of the vendor to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors.
166 N.E. at 803.
75. See Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242.
76. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1571, 13 Eliz. c.5. The statute
provides that" ... fraudulent feoffments... grants... conveyances.., devised
and contrived of malice, fraud . . . or guile to the end, purpose and intent, to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors ... shall be utterly void...."
77. See Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74, 77 (1880).
78. See GLENN, supra note 69, at 488-90.
79. The Ohio appellate court has stated,
(continued)
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E. Creditor
Section 1313.56 says that a preference "is void as to creditors... at
the suit of any creditor." It does not say whether "any creditor"
includes future creditors, meaning those who became creditors
subsequent to the preference."0 The courts, however, seem to have
operated under the assumption that only a person who had a claim
when the transfer occurred can maintain the action."1 Even in an
early bankruptcy decision holding that subsequent creditors could,
under section 6343, share in the recovery of property fraudulently
conveyed, the court made clear that the state law action authorized by
section 6343 had been brought, in fact, by creditors holding claims at
the time of the fraud. 2 It is not necessary to have reduced a claim to
It is apparent to this court from the record that appellant did have
the required knowledge set forth in R.C.1313.57. In his deposition, Mr.
Leiser, president of appellant corporation, testified that appellant had in
its files the petition of bankruptcy of Ronald Cole. This petition gave
appellant notice of Mr. Cole's financial problems, and that Mr. Cole had
many other creditors. Mr. Leiser also testified that Cole was unable to
obtain credit elsewhere. In light of these facts, it is clear that in order for
Cole to obtain additional loans, although supported by additional
collateral, he was forced to prefer appellant over other creditors. It is
equally clear that appellant had knowledge of sufficient facts to charge
it with knowledge of Cole's forbidden intent.
Diamond Savings & Loan v. Cole, No. 5-85-24 (Ohio App. Oct. 29, 1986) (Lexis,
States library, Ohio file, App subfile).
80. "Future creditors" are protected by § 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act: "Transfers Fraudulent as to Present and Future Creditors."
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4, 7A U.LA 639 (1985).
81. See, e.g., Prose v. Beardsley, 18 Ohio App. 211 (1924), which does not
expressly hold that the plaintiff creditors must have been creditors when the
assignment was made, but does carefully specify that at least one of the
plaintiffs was a creditor at that time. 18 Ohio App. at 211-12, and 216.
82. In re Kohler, 159 Fed. 871, 872 (6th Cir. 1908). The court made the
point that were it not for such a rule, a debtor in failing circumstances could
deliberately effect a preference in favor of existing creditors at the expense of
anticipated future creditors by making a fraudulent conveyance. But for the
rule adopted in Kohler, which distributes the recovered assets among all
creditors, the fraudulently conveyed assets, once recovered, would benefit only
the creditors existing when the fraudulent conveyance was made. Id. at 873-74.
Kohler anticipated Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), under which all creditors,
(continued)
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judgment in order to sue.83 But the very existence of case law
resolving that issue and referring to persons with such existing, but
unresolved, claims as "subsequent" creditors 4 indicates that only a
creditor who had a claim against the debtor at the time of the
preference can bring suit under section 1313.56.86
F. The Time for Suit
There is no "reach-back" period in section 1313.56 analogous to
the ninety-day and one-year insider reach-back periods in section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, a creditor and a bankruptcy
trustee can avoid an Ohio preference no matter when the preference
may have occurred, unless barred by limitations.
The leading authority on when an Ohio preference case does
become time-barred is Maas v. Miller,86 which was decided by the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1898. In Maas v. Miller, the debtor made a
transfer in February 1885 for the benefit of fewer than all his
creditors. In May 1893, a nonpreferred creditor sued to have the
transfer set aside. The plaintiff-creditor's case was framed in terms
of fraud under section 6344 of the Revised Code.8" The common pleas
court and appellate court both ruled that the case was barred by the
four-year fraud statute of limitations in section 4982 of the Revised
Statutes.' The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and granted judgment
for the plaintiff. The court stated that the record in the suit made out a
not just those eligible to void the transfer, share in what the trustee recovers
under § 544(b).
83. See Sechrist v. Veres, 9 Ohio Op. 492 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1937), and cases
discussed therein.
84. Id.
85. In contemporary bankruptcy terms, a "creditor" is anyone holding a
"claim," and a claim may be "disputed," "unmatured," or "unliquidated."
Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(10) and (5).
86. 51 N.E. 158 (Ohio 1898).
87. The preference and fraud provisions of what is now section 1313.56
were then stated in sections 6343 and 6344, respectively, of the Revised Statutes.
See supra text at note 25.
88. Section 4982 then provided, in part, as follows: "Within four years[:] An
action for trespass upon real property.... An action for the recovery of personal
property.... An action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on
contract and not hereinafter enumerated. An action for relief on the ground of
fraud .... 1884 Ohio Laws 210. Section 4982 is now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.09 (Baldwin 1985).
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preference case under section 6343 of the Revised Statutes.8"
Therefore, the four-year fraud statute of limitations in section 4982
was inapplicable. The supreme court did not say what statute of
limitations did apply. But granting judgment for the plaintiff meant
that the section 6343 preference case was clearly not barred by the
passage of over eight years between preference and lawsuit.90
Is Maas v. Miller still good law? With respect to its holding that
the fraud statute of limitations does not apply to a preference, Maas v.
Miller is apparently as correct today as it was in 1898. With respect to
the rest of the case, however, and specifically the granting of
judgment eight years after the preference, its conclusion is less
reliable.
Section 6343, the statute on which judgment was granted in Maas
v. Miller, is the direct statutory ancestor of the preference provision in
today's section 1313.56. Some differences exist, however. Today's
law, unlike its counterpart ninety years ago, does not automatically
turn every preference into an assignment for the benefit of creditors.9
Nor does its operation depend upon the establishment of a trust by the
insolvent debtor.9 2 In other respects, however, particularly the
nonfraudulent nature of the debtor conduct proscribed by the statutes,
the preference clauses of sections 6343 and 1313.56 are alike. Indeed,
the 1898-1902 amendments, which came after Maas, made the
89. 51 N.E. at 161-62. The Supreme Court clearly identified the debtor
misconduct as a preference: "As the undeniable effect of the transaction was to
prefer McKenzie and Robb and the costs above named, that is enough to satisfy
the requirement that the assignment 'shall have been made with intent to prefer
one or more creditors." Id. at 161.
90. In Maas v. Miller, there was no discussion of laches, even though the
facts suggested that the grantee-defendant might have been seriously
prejudiced by the delay in suit. The grantee had used his own funds to pay taxes
and other charges owed by the debtor, and he claimed to have expended more
than the property was worth. 51 N.E. at 162.
It is clear from Maas v. Miller and other cases that the four-year statute does
apply to fraud cases under § 1313.56. See Stivens v. Summers, 67 N.E. 884 (Ohio
1903), Keidel Supply Co. v. Fair, No. C-76831 (Ohio App. Feb.8, 1978) (LEXIS,
States Lib., Ohio file).
91. On the other hand, today's statute is an even more powerful general
creditor weapon than old section 6343 was; if a receiver is appointed today, in
the aftermath of a preference, all of the debtor's property is administered for the
benefit of all the creditors. Under old section 6343, only the property that was
subject to the preferential transfer was to be administered for the benefit of
creditors. See supra note 22.
92. The Ohio Supreme Court, in Maas v. Miller, found that the conveyance
and the debtor's arrangement with the grantee "created a trust"; express trust
language had not been used used. 51 N.E. at 161.
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preference law function even less like a fraud law than it had before.
Its scope had broadened beyond outright bad behavior, consisting of
putting assets beyond the reach of diligent creditors, to include the
more subtle, less morally repellant, and less "fraudulent" tactic of
subverting a future collective insolvency proceeding. Since the basis
for the supreme court's decision in Maas v. Miller was the
irrelevance of fraud to the plaintiffs suit,9" and since fraud is even
less relevant to a section 1313.56 preference case today than it was in
1898, its seems reasonably clear that a section 1313.56 preference case
is not subject to the four-year fraud statute of limitations which was
held inapplicable in Maas.94
It does not necessarily follow, however, that preference cases
delayed more than eight years are not time-barred today. As noted
above, Maas v. Miller did not specify what period of limitations did
apply. What the court did say was,
This contract and the deed constituted one entire transaction,
and should be construed together; and, when thus construed,
that transaction, as has already been stated, was in law an
assignment of the property involved for the benefit of creditors
of the grantor, Miller. ***The issue respecting fraud and
collusion was immaterial in this respect, because the relief to
which the plaintiff, as the representative of the creditors of
Miller, was entitled, under section 6343, Rev. St., upon the
undisputed facts, did not depend upon the establishment of
fraud, either actual or constructive; but might properly rest on
the fact that the deed and agreement created a trust. And as a
cause of action arising under that section does not depend
93. "The issue respecting fraud and collusion was immaterial ... because
the relief to which the plaintiff ... was entitled under section 6343, Revised
Statutes ... did not depend upon the establishment of fraud .... 51 N.E. at 163.
94. In Maas v Miller, the court said that none of the other provisions in
section 4982 applied. This eliminated from consideration a catch-all four-year
provision covering actions for injuries "to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on
contract and not hereinafter enumerated." From all that appears in Maas v.
Miller, the preference case was not "hereinafter enumerated"; the Supreme
Court opinion nowhere specified what limitation period did apply to it. As set
out now in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(D), the catch-all provision
establishes a four-year limitation period "[flor an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections 2305.10 to 2305.12,
inclusive, 2305.14 and 1304.29 of the Revised Code." None of the referenced
sections is applicable to a section 1313.56 preference case. The four-year catch-
all provision, therefore, has no more application today to a preference than it did
in 1898.
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upon fraud, or fall within any other class of actions that
section 4982, Rev. St., requires to be commenced within four
years, the issue growing out of the averment that the cause of
action in this case had accrued more than four years before the
action was commenced was also immaterial.95
This passage suggests that the presence of a "trust" may have had as
much to do with the outcome in Maas v. Miller as did the absence of a
fraud. Perhaps what the supreme court had in mind, but somehow did
not mention (in granting judgment without alluding to the applicable
statute of limitations in a case that had been appealed to it from the
lower courts on the limitations issue), was an exception from all
statutes of limitations applicable "in the case of a continuing or
subsisting trust."' Whether an assignment in trust for the benefit of
creditors is, in fact, a "continuing and subsisting trust" is
questionable." This hypothesis would explain, however, the supreme
court's handling of the timeliness issue without specifying an
applicable statutory period. If this analysis (and reading between the
lines) of Maas v. Miller is correct, then the open-ended, eight-year-
at-the-least period for bringing preference cases countenanced in
Maas v. Miller cannot be relied upon today, for section 1313.56,
unlike section 6343, is no longer linked to trusts nor necessarily
95. Maas, 51 N.E. 158, 163 (emphasis added).
96. The exception was then stated in section 4974 of the Revised Code.
Section 4974 has become OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.22 (Baldwin 1990).
97. See Irwin v. Lloyd, 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 212 (Hamilton Circuit Ct. 1900),
affd 61 N.E. 157 (Ohio 1901).
It is the claim... that the statute of limitations... does not apply...
that the trustee [under an assignment for the benefit of creditors]
having in his hands money applicable to the payment of dividends to
creditors makes it a case of a continuing and subsisting trust, which,
under the provisions of section 4974, Revised Statutes, are not
governed by our statute of limitations. But we think it clear that this
claim is not well founded, and that this is not such a trust. As held in
many cases in Ohio, this provision only applies to those technical and
continuing trusts which are not recognized at law, but fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of chancery, and other trusts are not exempt from
the statute.
Id. at 214-15.
See also Yearly v. Long, 40 Ohio St. 27, 32 (1883), holding that a
constructive trust or implied trust is not a "continuing and subsisting trust"
excepted from the operation of the statute of limitations.
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connected with assignments for the benefit of creditors. The
reasoning in Miller, therefore, if it did in fact depend on those
outdated, trust-based preference characteristics, would not fit many
preference cases pursuant to section 1313.56.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that displacement of the
eight-year period allowed in Maas v. Miller depends on a conjecture
about what the Ohio Supreme Court thought it was doing when it
decided the case. Taken simply on its "preference" facts and its
holding, Maas v. Miller would still mean that an eight-year-old
transfer was not too old to be vulnerable to preference attack today.
In the end, however, because Maas v. Miller does not provide
clear-cut specificity on the applicable statutory period, the case must be
regarded as a somewhat doubtful authority. What, then, is the
statutory period if the case's holding allowing an eight-year reach-
back period is no longer the law ?
While there is no direct authority on point, the statutory provisions
most clearly applicable are either section 2305.07, which provides that
"an action . . . upon a liability created by statute other than a
forfeiture or a penalty, shall be brought within six years after the
cause thereof accrued,"98 or section 2305.14, which provides a ten-year
time bar for cases not covered by other specific limitations periods.99
If section 1313.56 can be read to create a liability on the part of the
preferred creditor whose preference is avoided, then section 2305.07,
on its face, applies to a preference case. Otherwise, by default, the ten-
year period would be applicable.
Exact resolution of the timeliness issue, however, is probably not
critical. All of the periods are longer, by far, than the federal reach-
back period. And in a bankruptcy case, invocation of section 1313.56
will require proof that the preferential transfer had been made "in
contemplation of insolvency" by a debtor who then stayed out of
bankruptcy for whatever period elapsed between the preference and
the commencement of the bankruptcy case. For that reason, the
outside limits of the reach-back period possible under section 1313.56
are not going to be tested often.
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (Baldwin 1990). Section 2305.07 has
been applied to the analogous case of director's statutory liability for a dividend
distribution made by an insolvent bank. See Hart v. Guardian Trust Co., 75
N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. Com. P. 1945).
99. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.14 (Baldwin 1990).
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G. The Appointment of a Receiver
Section 1313.56's caption, "Appointment of a Receiver," is hardly
informative with respect to the substantive avoiding powers provided
for in that section.10 0 The caption does reflect, however, the early
legislative intent to allow all creditors to share ratably (via the
instrumentality of the receiver) in the assets which the debtor had
attempted to dispose of preferentially or fraudulently. Nevertheless,
the appointment of a receiver under section 1313.56 is not
mandatory. 10 1 Unilateral creditor action, outside the context of a
collective enforcement proceeding, has occurred,'0 2 but it is
inconsistent with the equality of distribution policy, which underlies
preference law, to allow a single creditor to avoid a preference solely
on its own behalf. All that such a suit accomplishes is the substitution
of a different "preferred" creditor for the one originally and literally
preferred by the debtor.0 3 This anomaly is not encountered when
r
100. The caption appeared after the enactment of the Ohio General Code in
1910; see OHIO GENERAL CODE § 11104. (1910).
101. "[A] receiver may be appointed .. " (emphasis added) OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1313.56. See Malone v. Summer & Co., 244 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ohio App.
1968) suggesting that the court's discretion is limited to implementing some
form of collective enforcement if a receiver is not appointed.
102. See, e.g., Delia v. Commissioner., 362 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1966)
(commissioner recovered the entire preference for the Treasury, invoking
section 1313.56; perhaps there were no other creditors, or a tax lien was superior
to all other creditor claims).
103. See Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1963): "Yet if the transfer
were set aside in favor of another creditor, there would be but a substitution of
one preference for another." Id.
See also GLENN, supra note 69, § 289, at 490: "[A]wkward situations may
arise when a State law undertakes to make preferences illegal without, at the
same time, establishing a system of liquidation and attaching the preference
provisions to the system."
The preference situation is to be contrasted with the setting aside of a
fraudulent conveyance by a single creditor. Such a creditor may, as a result,
gain a greater interest in the property fraudulently transferred than that of
other unsecured creditors; such an interest, in fact, may constitute an
involuntary "preference" to the extent that it gives the creditor setting aside the
fraudulent conveyance a larger share of the debtor's assets than the share
received by each of the rest of the creditors. Nothing in fraudulent conveyance
law or policy, however, is offended by unequal distribution of a debtor's assets.
Indeed, the creditor successful in setting aside a fraudulent conveyance is
rewarded for winning the "race of diligence" by getting a larger slice of the
debtor's limited assets. See Joseph E. Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances and
Preferences in Virginia, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 54-58 (1979).
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section 1313.56 is invoked in bankruptcy; all unsecured creditors
share equally in the assets recovered by the trustee under section
544(b).'04
III. OHIO PREFERENCE LAW AND FEDERAL PREFERENCE LAW
COMPARED
A. The Federal Preference
An avoidable federal preference is a transaction that 1) satisfies
all five conditions set out in Bankruptcy Code section 547(b), 105 and 2)
does not fall within any of the seven exceptions from avoidance
provided for in section 547(c).'06
104. See Malone v. Summer & Co., 244 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio App. 1968)
(suggesting that a bankruptcy trustee performs the same function that a
receiver would perform when a preference is avoided under section 1313.56).
105. Section 547(b) provides,
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was
an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of
this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such
debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
106. Section 547 (c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a
transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor
to or for whose benefit such transfer was
(continued)
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made to be a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to the
debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous
exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the
debtor in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value
that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of
a security agreement that
contains a description of such
property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the
secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to
acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to
acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor
receives possession of such property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of
the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security
interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not
make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the
benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that
the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest
exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the
later of-
(continued)
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Sections 547(b)(1) and (2) state the two threshold generic
requirements for any preference: a transfer by a debtor on account of
an antecedent debt.107 The debtor's insolvency when the transfer
occurs, the third requirement, is presumed.' 8 Under section 547(b)(4),
the transfer must have occurred within ninety days before the
bankruptcy petition was filed, or, if the transferee is an "insider,"
within one year before the filing of the petition. The fifth condition for
avoidance, found in section 547(b)(5), is that the transferee-creditor
received more of the debtor's assets on account of the transfer than it
would have received if the transfer had not been made.'09
(A)
(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(bX4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before
the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection
(b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before
the date of the filing of the petition; of
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the
security agreement creating such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under §
545 of this title; or
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are
primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property
that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.
107. The meaning of transfer "to" a creditor is self explanatory; a transfer
"benefits" a creditor (without being "to" that creditor) when the debt is backed up
by a surety. In that case, payment benefits the surety by reducing or
discharging the surety's contingent liability. The surety, however, is also a
creditor because it has a contingent claim against the debtor. The surety's claim
is contingent on the debtor's failure to perform and the surety's performance in
its stead. Thus, the direct payment to one creditor benefits the other creditor, the
surety. The significance of referring both to transfers "to" a creditor and
transfers "for the benefit" of a creditor is that the trustee can avoid both and,
thus, recover the preference from either the direct obligor or the surety. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(5) ("claim"), and 101(10) ("creditor").
108. Section 547(f). The presumption pertains only to the last 90 days before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
109. Section 547(b)(5) insulates fully secured creditors from preference
attack. There are two reasons for this protection: a fully secured creditor who
receives a transfer from the debtor is no better off than it would have been if the
pre-petition transfer had not occurred because in that event it would receive
100% of its claim post-petition within the bankruptcy case; and, pre-petition
transfers to fully secured creditors do not prejudice unsecured creditors because
the debtor's equity in the collateral, which is available to meet the claims of
unsecured creditors, increases dollar for dollar with every transfer to a fully
secured creditor.
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B. Advantages and Disadvantages: The Bankruptcy Trustee
Perspective
As already indicated, Ohio preference law has one major
advantage for a bankruptcy trustee and several disadvantages in
comparison to section 547(b) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code."' The
advantage is a reach-back period measured in years instead of in
days, as under federal law (although the federal reach-back period is
one year if an insider is preferred). The disadvantages are the
necessity of identifying a "real" creditor who possesses a section
1313.56 claim, the possible nonapplication of sections 1313.56 and
1313.57 to "money payment" preferences, and the need to establish the
"mental" elements of an Ohio preference: the debtor's contemplation
of insolvency and design to prefer, and the creditor's knowledge of
the debtor's preferential intent.
C. Advantage: The Long Reach-Back Period
The lengthy Ohio reach-back period means that every
assignment, conveyance, and other transfer within the scope of
section 1313.56 remains potentially susceptible to avoidance if the
insolvent transferor becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case within the
next six, eight, or ten years after the conveyance occurs. It is obvious
that a period of uncertainty or repose of such duration significantly
increases the risks undertaken by lenders. I"
The magnitude of the increased risk, compared to the normal
bankruptcy preference exposure of ninety days, can be measured by
considering the "consternation in the commercial lending
industry""' caused by the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in the famous, or infamous, Deprizio"' case. In Deprizio, the
110. The other advantage is the non-application to an Ohio preference of the
seven exceptions from federal avoidance set out in section 547(c).
111. This long period of uncertainty, or repose, exists in theory whether
bankruptcy occurs or not; any creditor holding a claim when the transfer
occurred could sue in state court to avoid it. But the probabilities of actual
challenge based on sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 would seem to increase with
bankruptcy. See infra text at note 124.
112. Donald W. Baker, Repayments of Loans Guaranteed by Insiders as
Avoidable Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 UCC L.J.
115 (1990).
113. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The
case was known as In re Deprizio before it reached-the Seventh Circuit and it is
commonly referred to in the literature as Deprizio. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits
have followed Deprizio. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.),
(continued)
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circuit court held that the longer, one-year, "insider" federal
preference reach-back period, not the standard ninety-day period,
applied to preferences that were paid to noninsiders, provided the debt
had been guaranteed by an insider. Deprizio was "[t]he big news of
1989,''114 and its preference holding "jolted the lending
community.""' 5 "Controversy and consternation over the
decision"" 6 ensued. It is predicted that Deprizio will lead to
"alarming new litigation against financial institutions and other
unsuspecting recipients of seemingly innocuous transfers.""' 7 Its
"chilling effect on the credit industry""' and its possible "profound
impact on preference law""' 9 have all been noted.
The Deprizio issue has elicited voluminous commentary in the
legal literature, 2 ' including recommendations on how to create
distinguishable situations' and thus prevent the trustee from using a
one-year reach-back period. Deprizio's holding meant that the reach-
back period on federal preferences was four times longer than
899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey
(In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
114. Albert J. Givray, Letters of Credit, 45 Bus. LAW. 2381, 2452 (1990).
115. Id. at 2453.
116. Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up
Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151, 2159 (1990).
117. David I. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended
Preference Exposure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial
Transferee Liability, 45 Bus. LAW. 511, 537 (1990).
118. Id at 537.
119. Mark E. Toth, Comment, The Impossible State of Preference Law
Under the Bankruptcy Code: Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. and the
Problems of Insider-Guaranteed Debt, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1155, 1167 (1990).
120. Borowitz, supra note 116, at 2152 n.2 cites to 14 commentaries. More
have appeared in the meantime: See eg., Thomas D. Buckley, Insider
Guaranties: Their Effect On The Bankruptcy Preference "Reach Back" Period
And Possible Use In Getting An "Ordinary Course" Exception From Avoidance,
22 U. TOL. L. REV. 247 (1991); Marc L. Hamroff & Robert S. Cohen, One Year
Preference Recoveries Can Extend to Lenders and Other Non-Insider Creditors,
96 COM. L.J. 153 (1991); Robert E. Higgins & David E. Peterson, Is There A One-
Year Preference Period for Non-Insiders?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383 (1990); see
also Givray, supra notes 114-15; Borowitz, supra note 116; Katzen, supra notes
117-18.
121. See Baker, supra note 112; Andrew J. Nussbaum, Insider Preferences
and the Problem of Self-Dealing Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
603 (1990); Barry L. Zaretsky, Indirect Preferences Pose New Risk To
Noninsiders and Secured Creditors, 1989-90 CoM. LENDING REV. 46 (1990); R.
Jamison Williams, Jr. & Robert S. Bick, Insider Guarantees: Emerging Theories
of Preference Recoveries, 69 MICH. B.J. 691 (1990).
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preferred creditors had wanted and anticipated it to be.'22 Ohio's
reach-back period for preferences is far longer than that in Deprizio,
and it applies regardless of whether an insider is involved. For a
bankruptcy trustee, the Ohio reach-back period could prove to be an
interesting and significant advantage over federal preference law. 2 '
D. Disadvantages of Ohio Law
1. Identifying a real creditor with a section 1313.56 claim
This disadvantage is built into every situation in which a
bankruptcy trustee invokes state law under section 544(b). Under
section 544(b), a trustee can avoid only those transfers that could be
avoided under state law by some identifiable unsecured creditor of the
debtor. Section 544(b) should be contrasted with the so-called "strong-
arm" clause of section 544(a), under which the trustee can exert the
rights under state law of "hypothetical" lien creditors. Under section
544(b), the trustee has a relatively "weak-arm" because of the
necessity of finding a real creditor whose claim can be pursued. It is
clearly harder to identify such a real creditor than it is to simply
establish the elements of a cause of action, which is all the trustee
must do to avoid a federal preference under section 547.
While there are relatively few reported state court cases involving
sections 1313.56 and 1313.57, the infrequency of preference litigation
does not in itself demonstrate that such "real" creditors are equally
scarce. Some creditors with section 1313.56 cases may be owed so little
that the cost of litigation would make the bringing of a suit
impractical. Bankruptcy, however, may increase the incentives for
122. Most of the lower court decisions on the issue before Deprizio had held
that the 90-day period applied to insider guaranteed claims; the scholarly
literature was evenly split. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp, 874 F.2d 1186,
1189, (7th Cir. 1989).
123. Should the United States Supreme Court, or Congress, ultimately reject
Deprizio's reading of the Bankruptcy Code, relegating trustees once again to the
confines of a 90 day reach-back period even for insider guaranteed debt, the
advantage of Ohio's longer, alternative, reach-back period would be even more
pronounced. While there is now no conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals,
lower courts in the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have declined to follow
the Deprizio lead. Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc. v. Chemical Bank (In re Rubin
Bros Footwear, Inc.), 119 Bankr. 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Performance
Communications, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Performance Communications,
Inc.), 126 Bankr. 473, 476 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.1991); Official Creditors' Comm. of
Arundel Housing Components v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (In re Arundel Housing
Components, Inc.), 126 Bankr. 216, 219 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991).
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invoking section 1313.56 for several reasons. A bankruptcy trustee's
action based on section 1313.56, even if derived from the rights of a
creditor with a very small claim, benefits all creditors, and, because
the effect of avoiding a transfer under section 1313.56 is to undo it in
its entirety, the stake at issue under section 1313.56 for a bankruptcy
trustee is the amount of the preference itself, not the amount of any
single small claim.'24 In addition, a bankruptcy petition signals the
end of the period during which creditor forbearance or optimism about
the debtor's prospects might have inhibited the starting of legal
proceedings to vindicate claims. A bankruptcy trustee has no such
inhibitions; the trustee's task is to immediately and vigorously
maximize the debtor's estate using all means at its disposal,
including all avoiding powers.
2. The "money payment" exception under Ohio law
If it were the law that money payments are not avoidable as
preferences under section 1313.56, Ohio preference law would still
apply to mortgages, security interests, and the granting of other
property interests by debtors who intended to prefer some creditors
over others. The avoidance power would be significantly weaker,
however, if money payments were exempt.
Against the background of de facto precedent in the Sixth Circuit
for applying sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 to money payments, and
given the weakness of the old Gettinger decision's discussion of
money payments and preference law, a reasonable possibility exists
that federal courts in bankruptcy could conclude that Ohio law does
not now exclude money payments from the scope of the preference
sections. Were the federal courts to reach such a decision, then this
"disadvantage" of the Ohio law would disappear.
3. The "mental elements" required for an Ohio preference
The parts of sections 1313.56 and 1313.57 dealing with the debtor's
design to prefer and the creditor's knowledge of that intent have no
direct counterparts in section 547. It is possible for a bankruptcy
trustee to establish the five elements listed in section 547(b) and avoid
a preference without any reference whatsoever to the debtor's intent or
the preferred creditor's knowledge of the debtor's intent.
124. For example, in In re Plonta, 311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1962), a bankruptcy
trustee using the predecessor of § 544(b) avoided a lien securing a $1600
indebtedness, based on the rights under state law of an unsecured creditor with
a $10 claim.
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The creditor's knowledge of the debtor's insolvency had been an
element of a preference under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.125 It was left
out of the present Bankruptcy Code, except for insider-creditors, in
part because it was thought that the high volume of litigation on the
subject undermined the effectiveness of preference law. 126 Even
insider-creditor knowledge of debtor insolvency was eliminated as a
preference element in 1984.127 It is clearly easier to establish the
objective concrete facts specified in section 547(b) than it is to prove, in
effect, not only those facts but also the attendant mental attitudes of the
debtor and the creditor (as required by sections 1313.56 and 1313.57).
In this respect, therefore, the federal law seems to be a more powerful
avoidance tool than state law.
The comparison of federal and Ohio preference law is not
complete, however, until the federal exceptions from avoidance are
also considered. When the section 547(c)(2) "ordinary course" 121
exception is added to the federal avoidance equation, the "mental
elements" that seemingly distinguished Ohio preference law from
federal law become factors once again, according to the cases, under
the federal law.
The leading case in the Sixth Circuit on the "ordinary course"
exception is In re Fulghum Const. Co.129 In Fulghum, the court said
that "no precise legal test" applied in section 547(c)(2) cases, but that
the "court must engage in a 'peculiarly factual' analysis." 3 ' In one
of four positive references in Fulghum to the Eleventh Circuit's Craig
Oil decision, the court added, "There is no allegation that the
repayment... was in bad faith. See In re Craig Oil... (debtor's state
125. See § 60b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 562
(repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.95-598, title IV,
Nov. 6,1978,92 Stat. 2682.
126. See Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, H.R. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973).
127. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No.98-353,98 Stat. 333.
128. 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(2) provides "The trustee may not avoid under this
section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;"
129. 872 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 743.
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of mind is relevant to determining if § 547(c)(2) exception is
available). ***'[N]othing in the record suggests that [the repayment]
(sic) was related in any way to pre-bankruptcy planning." 13 1 In
Fulghum, the court held that, under all the circumstances, the section
547(c)(2) exception did apply.
In Craig Oil 3 2 itself, the Eleventh Circuit, in declining to find that
the "ordinary course" exception applied, had said that the debtor's
state of mind was not "immaterial in applying the preference
exception of section 547(c)(2). '1 3 3 "Whenever the bankruptcy court
receives evidence of unusual collection efforts, it must consider
whether the debtor's payment was in response to those efforts."'34 The
preferential payments in Craig Oil were made with cashier's checks.
The debtor began paying the preferred creditor with cashier's checks
after the preferred creditor had been invited by others to join in the
filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor and
had asked the debtor for a showing of good faith. The Eleventh Circuit
found "no error in the lower court's consideration of Craig's motive
for continued payment to Marathon. ... ""' On the other hand, the
court added, "This state of mind alone cannot establish 'unusual' or
'extraordinary' action by the debtor. It merely goes to explain the
unusual payment actions by the debtor in this case.'
' 36
The reference in Fulghum to "pre-bankruptcy planning," which
sounds like section 1313.56's "contemplation of insolvency," and the
Sixth Circuit's approval in Fulghum of the use made in Craig Oil of
state of mind to help determine whether a transaction was in the
"ordinary course," indicate that mental attitudes can still make a
difference in federal preference law. 137
131. Id. at 745. See In re Craig Oil Co., 785 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added).
132. In re Craig Oil Co., 785 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1986).
133. 1& at 1566.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. There is also some apparently careless post-Fulghum dictum to the
contrary, at the bankruptcy court level. "In determining whether the §5 47(cX2 )
is applicable (sic), the creditor-transferee's knowledge or state of mind is
irrelevant to the issue, unlike the former requirement under §60 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The legislative history of §547 is clear to state that 'a
creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of equality
of distribution .. "' In re Cook United, Inc., 117 Bankr. 884, 888-89 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990).
In Cook United the court rejected the creditor's argument that chronically
late transfers were, nevertheless, in the "ordinary course" because in the utility-
(continued)
[20:863
HeinOnline  -- 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 904 1991
OHIO'S PREFERENCE LAW IN BANKRUPTCY
Hard evidence, such as a sudden switch to the use of cashier's
checks for making payments, would point to a conclusion that a
nonordinary course transaction had occurred, whatever the parties'
mental attitudes might have been. Knowing that it was done to pacify
the creditor (ie., to prefer it) and deter the creditor from putting the
debtor into involuntary bankruptcy made the nonordinary course
conclusion easier to reach in Craig Oil. But that kind of hard evidence
would be probative on intent and knowledge, as well as on "ordinary
course." Why, indeed, would a debtor ever pay one creditor, but not
others, with cashier's checks, unless it wanted for some reason (such
as purchasing its neutrality with respect to involuntary bankruptcy)
to "prefer" that creditor? In other words, the same kind of evidence
that would help support a finding of nonordinary course dealing
under federal law would often tend to prove the mental attitudes under
Ohio law as well.
The significance of debtor and creditor mental attitudes under
section 547 should not be underestimated just because they get into the
federal avoidance formula only by way of their relevance to an
exception from avoidance. That exception has potential to become a
major loophole in the power to avoid preferences under federal law.
The possible widespread application and exploitation of the "ordinary
course" exception is the inadvertent result of one of the changes
Congress made in the Bankruptcy Code in 1984. Originally, the
"ordinary course" exception had been intended to apply only to
transfers with respect to short-term debt, such as telephone bills and
other accounts with approximately monthly billing cycles. It was "a
creditor's business judgment, the debtor's late payments did not warrant
discontinuance of service, deposit requirements, or other unusual terms or
restrictions. The concrete facts ruled out application of §547(c)(2).
The court's strong language dismissing the relevancy of state of mind
evidence in preference law may have been an example of what the Eleventh
Circuit calls "sliding" away from the real issue. In Cook United, that issue was
whether a §547(c) exception from avoidance applied; the § 547(b) preference
elements had all been stipulated. In Craig Oil the Eleventh Circuit observed that
Marathon [the creditor] correctly concludes that a creditor's state of
mind is now immaterial in finding a preference. In making this
argument, Marathon slides away from the issue in this case-which is
not whether there was a preference, but whether the preferred transfer
was in the ordinary course of business.... It does not follow.., that a
debtor's state of mind or motivation is likewise immaterial in applying
the preference exception of §547(cX2)."
785 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986).
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variant of the contemporaneous exchange exception.""13 This idea
was codified in the form of a provision limiting the "ordinary
course" exception to transfers on account of debt incurred within
forty-five days of its repayment. Much litigation ensued concerning
the calculation of the forty-five day period.19 Congress' response was
to eliminate the forty-five day rule in the 1984 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. 140 The Supreme Court has now held that what is left
of section 547(c)(2) means what it says: repayment of any debt,
including long-term debt, qualifies for the section 547(c)(2) exception,
provided the stated "ordinary course" standards are met.14 1 Thus, an
exception created for creditors who earned it by putting value into a
declining debtor shortly before getting it back out again has evolved,
accidentally, 42 into an exception potentially available to all
creditors. As a result, under federal preference law, all transfers on
account of antecedent debt made within the federal reach-back period
may, nevertheless, escape avoidance if their recipients can establish
that they were made in the "ordinary course." One can anticipate,
therefore, that this exception, which calls into play the mental
attitudes of both the debtor and the preferred creditor, will in the future,
be a factor in an increasing number of federal preference cases.
Nevertheless, it is clear that a bankruptcy trustee's task is easier
under the federal statute. In a situation in which the debtor makes a
transfer on account of an antecedent debt, but is not acting because of
awareness of present or impending insolvency, and has no intent to
prefer (and there is, therefore, nothing for the creditor to have
forbidden knowledge of) there will be no avoidance at all possible
under Ohio preference law. Such a transfer may well be avoidable,
however, under federal law. All that can be said about the
significance in the federal context of the "missing" Ohio elements is
138. In re Craig Oil Co., 785 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1986).
139. See, e.g., Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (In re Emerald Oil), 695
F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1983); Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981);
Wickam v. United American Bank (In re Property Leasing and Mgmt. Inc.), 46
Bankr. 903 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
140. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No.98-353, 98 Stat.333.
141. Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991). The Sixth Circuit had
earlier come to the same conclusion. Gosch v. Burns (In re Finn), 909 F.2d 903
(6th Cir. 1990). Union Bank resolved a conflict between the Sixth and the Ninth
Circuits. See CHG Intl, Inc. v. Barclay's Bank (In re CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d
1479 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. Long-term lenders did not lobby for the amendment. See Ragsdale v.
Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, Inc. (In re Control Elec., Inc.), 91 Banki. 1010,
1013 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
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that their absence creates a somewhat better possibility of
nonavoidance because the situation may fit within the "ordinary
course" exception under section 547(c)(2).
CONCLUSION
Ohio law provides bankruptcy trustees with an alternative
preference avoiding power that can be invoked in situations in which
the more familiar federal preference law is inapplicable. The Ohio
alternative has the potential to be of real significance. Its longer
reach-back period is clearly of major importance. On the other hand,
the difficulties in establishing the elements of an Ohio preference
could discourage its use. It will be interesting to see -whether trustees
in Ohio bankruptcy cases are able, in the future, to exploit the
possibilities inherent in state preference law.
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